Eisenhower and Obama

America demands Israeli concessions for peace, Israel stubbornly refuses to relent under the pressure. The President tells Israel to withdraw from the lands it occupied in the war; the Prime Minister doggedly attempts to deflect the pressure and hold onto as much as possible. The Israeli public backs the PM; coalition members and opposition parties castigate American interference and lopsided behavior against Israel.

The American administration threatens economic punishment should Israel not fall into line. The administration faces significant criticism for this not only from Jewish groups like the Bnai Brith, but scathing attacks for its conduct by congress.

The President, of course, is Dwight Eisenhower, and the year is 1956. The war was the 1956 Suez-Sinai War between Israel and Egypt, and the concessions referred to are the Sinai and Gaza Strip, to be vacated with no preconditions. The Israeli PM is David Ben-Gurion.

The similarities to today’s Israeli-American feud are striking. Obama demands; Netanyahu, bolstered by his hawkish government, refuses to give in to all his demands. No doubt the circumstances of the 1956-1957 crisis, as well as the 1975 diplomatic scuffle over the Sinai between Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin both weigh heavily in the heart and mind of Bibi Netanyahu. Direct confrontation with an American president is the last thing he wants.

But a lot has changed since 1956 and 1975. Israel today is far larger, more developed, and less dependent on America. Bibi’s anxiety is misplaced. Israel in 1956 had just under 2 million citizens, in 1975 less than 3.5 million, but today well over 7 million. While American aid made up nearly 20% of the Israeli government’s budget in as late as the 1980’s, today it makes up only about 4-5%.

While Israel used to be heavily debt-ridden, today its net debt (about $30 billion) is smaller than what is owed to it (about $60 billion), and most of the money owed to Israel is from the US federal government. US loan guarantees, which were used as a means to coerce Israel not only in 1956 and 1975 but also during the Bush-Shamir spat in the late 80s/early 90s, now are essentially meaningless. Israel has a massive surplus of foreign currency and already owns nearly $60 billion of America’s debt.

In 1956 David Ben-Gurion refused to capitulate to Eisenhower’s demands for half a year, until a compromise was reached in which Israel ceded the Sinai and Gaza in exchange for UN forces in both areas and explicit US promises regarding Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Though the decision was certainly a far cry from Ben-Gurion’s November 1956 speech pledging to retain both the Sinai and Gaza, it marked the first time that an Israeli Premier would stand toe-to-toe with an antagonistic American administration and not be the first to blink.

Eisenhower’s administration led the UN in condemning Israel and threatened to orchestrate international economic sanctions against Israel. Israel, it was estimated, could survive for 12 months in such a scenario, before collapsing in the face of sanctions. Ben-Gurion was certainly aware of the intense pressure Eisenhower faced from congress, which refused to support his legislation as long as the specter of sanctions loomed over Israel.

If Ben-Gurion could stand up against Eisenhower for at least a compromise, Netanyahu is in a far better position to stand up and give Obama nothing. With his coalition partners Lieberman and Eli Yishai giving him full support and Likud MKs demanding no concessions, the only question is, will Netanyahu have the prescience to not only remember 1956, but see the advantages Israel now has.